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INTRODUCTION 
The intent of this paper is to delineate the determinants of 
the distribution of income in Rawalpindi city. The basic hypothesis 
to be tested is that for each individual, personal earnings are a 
function of his socio-economic characteristics ie. age,sex, education 
etc. If the hypothesis bears out, the disparity of incomes within the 
city would then prove to be a consequence of the variation in these 
individual characteristics. It would then be of interest to quantify 
the effect of each of these determinants on the eventual distribution 
of income. 
lit 
he paper has been divided into six sections. The first sets 
out the methodology and the theoretical framework for the analysis. 
The next section looks at some previous research which is of relevance 
to the topic. In section 3 the data set is described and some reservations 
about it discussed. The results are presented in sections k and 5» 
In the conclusion some econometric problems and the main results of the 
analysis are discussed* 
« 
The author is a Research Economist at the Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics. Much gratitude is ovred to K. Hamdani and Dennis 
Detray for the considerable help and advice that they were always willing 
to give. 
Theoretical Fry.mowork 
The basic framework for the following analysis is provided 
by the theory of human capital. The corner stone of this theory 
is that human beings invest in themselves in a variety of ways 
i.e. incur present costs for future benefits. Education, on-the-
job-training, work experience are all important manifestations of 
this phenomenon of self-investment, '•'•he acquisition of human 
capital raises an individuals productivity, and because employers 
pay in proportion to productivity, the individuals earnings. Each 
person invests in human capital to the point where the marginal 
1 return equals marginal cost,, 
In this study education is used as a direct human capital 
variable while age is taken as a proxy for the human capital 
variable work-experienced '•'•'he hypothesis therefore is that 
personal earnings are a positive function of age and education. 
Thi3 relationship to expected to explain much of the observed 
variation in earnings. 
However the observed relation between earnings on the one 
hand and education and age on the other, may just be a statistical 
illusion. For example if only the children of the rich can afford 
to go to school, then the well paid jobs which they might get after 
finishing school may not be a result of the amount of human capital 
acquired, but of their family connections. Similarly if only the 
1 B.ecker "Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income. 
P 
In the human capital specification education should be a continuou; 
variable measured as the number of years of formal schooling., The 
Rawalpindi Survey however picked up only the educational level attained. 

equation. Considerable useful information about the sample or any break 
down on the sample that we may wish to consider, can be obtained from 
these summary statistics. Of particular interest v/ould be the log 
variance of income a much used measure of income inequality^. 
Being a relative measure of inequality, the log-variance will be 
useful to us mainly when making sub-sectoral comparisons, i.e. when we 
consider various sub-samples* 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Income distribution studies in economic literature tend to be one 
of three district types. The first is concerned with the statistics of 
the observed distribution of income. Statistical distributions which 
best fit the observed distribution of income or the distribution above 
a certain level, are examined. Underlying stochastic processes which 
k 
could generate such distribution are also studied . For the second type 
the inequality measures like the Gini coefficient are calculated. 
Comparisons of these measures amongst nations, amongst regions within 
nations or amongst various grouping within a population are then made 5 in an attempt to understand inequality . 
The third type of study is? relatively new and unlike the other two 
is derived from economci theory. This is the theory of human capital, 
that has already been discussed. As noted earlier, here an individual's 
"^ See »sen" ^  9 J about the merits and de-merits of the measure. 
Basically the log variance is a relative measure of income inequality. 
ihe measure is free of any change of units. It is sensitive to income 
transfers at the lower end of the scale and therefore useful to us as we a 
probably dealing with the middle portion of the income distributions. 
k 
See for example D.G. Chanpernowne "A model of income distribution 
Economic Journal June 1953 * Maadelbovt, "The Pareto Levy Law and the 
distribution of income", International Economic Review. May 1960. 
^James Morgan "The anaton of income distribution", Review of Econom 
and Statistics. P.D. Ojha and V.V. Bnatt "Pattern of income distribution 
an underdeveloped economy. A case study of India". American Economic Rev 
September 1964. 
earning are a ositive function of the amount of human capital he possesses • 
-he distribution of income is therefore a conscquerce of individual supply 
and demand for hunan capital., 
In Pakistan, research on the distribution of income has been 
mainly of the second type, i„e0 the calculation of inequality measures. 
In her study on the "Measurement of Inequality in Urban Incomes in 
Pakistan", Khadija Haq calculates the Gi.ni . coefficients for the years 
1948-^9 to 1960-61 and estimates the trend over time of inequalit^ . 
For her data, she uses the estimates of personal income based on the 
" All Pakistan Income Tax Returns " published by the CSO. Her analysis is 
therefore restricted to the very high income groups, ( over P.s. 35°00 per 
month ) and soi.e 0.01$ of the population. For this income group, her results 
show that (a) income is more inequally distributed in Pakistan than most 
developed and developing countries, (b) income is shelved in favour of the 
rich but the trend is towrrds the reduction of disparities within the high 
8 
income bracket . Her analysis however does not include any estimate of 
leakages due to misrepcrting of taxes. Also over time the proportion of 9 
fringe benefits in personal income may have been increasing./ An inclusion 
6 
Gary S. Backer " Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of 
Income. J. Mincer. "The distribution of labour incomes, survey". Journal 
of Economic Literature March 01, 1970. 
n 
She calculates both the Gini coefficient and thePuareto coefficient 
for all the years between 19^8-^9 and 1960-61. Both these coefficients reveal 
a negative trend. The Gini oefficient falls from 0.61 in 19^8-49 to 0,k5 
in 1960-61. 
g 
It w;.ulu be fair to point out that she qualifies these results rather 
heavily. She s ts out clearly the limitations of her data. On her results 
the relative position of new entrants and lower income groups in the tax-
paying population is imprcving. She also notes that the tax-paying population 
has been receiving an increasing share of the national income while paying a 
decreasing percentage of it in taxes. 
9 The author is concious of these. 
of cither of these may give an increasing trend for inequality 
For our purposes, a more interesting study and one to which 
frequent reference will b, made is Blaug's study of earnings in Thailand. 
11 
Blaug had a very large sample, about 9000 observations " A large amount 
of detailed information was collected for each individual. For example 
questions was asked on all the jobs held by an individual; fringe benefit 
in cash or kind; social background of respondents; the type of school 
attended occupations, hours of work; sector of employment and even income 
from property and self-employment. 
From these individual characteristics Blaug derived 69 new variable: 
Using a specification similar to the one used in this paper, and stepwise 
regression procedures he sifted out the effects of these variables on inci 
the dependent variable. The results of his analysis were:-
(i) An almost line:ir age-earnings profile. There was a very shallot 
concavily in the ago earning profile which could not be picked 
up by the normal human capital specification using age and the 
square of age. 
(ii) Education w s an important determinant of the distribution of 
income. The hypothesis of a positive relationship between the 
two was accepted. 
Tl le only other study on personal income distribution for Pakistan v 
Ashbjorn Bergen's "Personal Income Distribution and Personal Savings in 
Pakistan 196.3-64". He measures the Gini coefficients for East Pakistan, We 
Pakistan, rural areas urban areas etc. ^sing the CSO's Quarterly survey d£ 
He also calculates saving ratios. Hie main conclusions however is that the 
data base is too weak for the analysis he was trying to do - Most other 
studies in Pakistan deal with national income and its distribution. 
11 
He used the household economic survey of 4,600 observations. As 
college graduates were under-represented, another survey was conducted. 2C 
random observations and 3000 men and women were "interviewed purposively 
to reach predetermined quotas defined in terms of ago sex and education. 

- : 8 : -
THE DATA 
The date used in the analysis is the Rawalpindi Socic-Economic survey 
conducted by the PIDE in 1975. As a detailed description of the survey the 
sampling design and the possible sampling and non sampling error is found 
in Hamdani / 7 J \ this discussion will only concentrate on the points of 
interest to us. Briefly basic socio economic information was collected from 
a thousand households in Rawalpindi. As Hamdani notes, "a tight budget necesi 
itatod the small sample size and the simple sampling design". He concludes 
however, that " the sampled households are representative of Rawalpindi". 
A brief summary of the data is as follows. The labour forces consists 
of 1641 individuals of whom 15^ 1 are males. A little less than half of the 
labour force % are regular employees while 33»^ % are self-employed. 
Surprisingly only l.'f °/o reported as being casual employers and 5.3 % as 
un-omployed. Uider-employment however was substantial : 23.8 °/o would like to 
13 
work more hour ; . A minority of the labour force are apprentices, 3.2 % and 
unpaid family helpers., 7-5 
The use of this data f< r an income distribution analysis however, must 
bo made, bearing in mind certain reservations. A brief description of the cit 
will bring out the first of these. Rawalpindi is the fifth largest city in 
Pakistan with an estimated population of 6,73,000 individuals in 197^. An 
important regional metropolis with primarily administrative functions, the 
city was the country's interim capital in the early sixties. The development 
of the cou?'try's new capital Islamabad on the outskirts of Rawalpindi has 
aided the development and expansion cf its wholesale trade and construction 
is however, a very unsatisfactory measure of under-employment. 
ife 
The figure w-.s arrived at by projecting the 1972 census estimate at 
a 3»2 % annual <-rowth rate. 
activities. Kanufacturinp activity is virtually non-existent in the city. 
Essentiall" the economic activities of the people in the city woul d be 
trade, construction and administrati n (i.e. rovernment employees P. The 
absence of manufacturing retivity ant*, the city's close proximity to the 
naticnal capital make it somewhat unrepresentative of the other urban areas 
of Pakistan. To that extent our results would be particular to Rawalpindi. 
A bias sterns from the sampling design. The sampling frame consisted 
only of structured and un-structured dwellings. This probably resulted in 
the data yielding an income distribution trancatcd at the lower tail ie. 
not enough representation of the very poor in the sample. If housing wore 
to be regarded as a normal rood, with a positive income effect, then it may 
16 
be assumed that the very peer live in unstructured or kutcha dwellings. 
Our saranle in that case underestimates the inequality or the variatior in 17 
incomee* The distinction between structured and unstructured dwellings 
however fades if we accept what is a fact in underdeveloped countries that 
the structured dwellings of the poor tend to be over-populated slums. In 
fact the moan income for our sample is Rs. 376 which is really very low 
especially when we take into account that there are on an average 3-29 
people dependent on an earner. This makes the per capita income in the 
15 
To this must added a samplinr bias. P-walpindi has had since the 
pre-independcnce days one of the largest army cantonments. The military 
personnel were however delibr-ately excludod from the sample because it is 
illegal to gather any information on them, 
16 
It could also be that living in the unstructured dwellings may b» 
recent migrants earning about the same as the others but in transit to move 
into the structured houses. 
17 
us mentioned e rlier the mean income for the sample is lower than 
the per capita income. The sample probably did not pick up enough of the 
rich. In either case there is sample reason to assume that the inequality 
has been undeiestimated. 
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Of the education coefficients technical education is the only 
category that presents a surprising result. Being a human capital 
variable, the attainment of technical education was also expected 
to raise earnings. In all our regressions however, the coefficient 
for this category is not significantly different from zero. This 
gives us the rather startling result that those with technical 
education earn no more than those without it. The only ineaninglul 
definition of this variable that the data would allow was more than 
six months of on the job training or apprenticeship. Formal technical 
education is available in very limited supply in Pakistan. Most 
skills are gair.ed through a very long period of apprenticeship. Not 
surprisingly ti e drop-out rate is very high. The regression coefficient 
nay thus be indicating this phenomenon. 
From the employment status variables, the excluded category is 
the regular employees. uf the included categories the self-employed 
with employees have the largest coefficient and the most significant. 
Individuals in this category (some sixty of them) earn about 58^5% more 
than regular employees. However for these "richer" self-employed it 
is probably reasonable to expect that part of their earnings is a 
return on capital. 
A somewhat surprising result is that for the self-employed 
without employees. These individuals as it turns out earn just about 
the same as the regular employees. The c asual workers however according to 
expectation earn about 20$ less than the regular emplyees. Roughly 
speaking the two categories, the- self-employed and the casuals constitute 
what is known as the informal sector. Theory suggests that individuals 
within these categories desire to get into the formal sector but market 
inperfections prevent then from doing so. For the self-employed higher 
earning it seems is not one of the incentives for wanting regular 
employment. For the casuals however it must be noted that only those 
who admitted to having worked for at least the past week were admitted 
into the category and their work - characteristics of the past week 
were recorded. No employment history for the past year or any long 
period was recorded. It would however not be unreasonable to assume 
that these workers would face periods of unemployment during a year. 
Average earning over the year for the casual should therefore be even 
lesser than these indicated by the regressions. Both the casuals and 
the self-employed however put in much longer hours than regular employees. 
The opportunity of any secondary employment is therefore severly limited 
for the former. Also these individuals are affected by the vagaries of 
the market whereas the regularly employed are not. 
For the migrant, the results are both the most surprising and the 
most interesting. The expectation in this case was that migrants in 
their early days of migration would probably earn less than the residents 
but gradually upon acquirihg location specific human capital they' would 
earn as much if net more than the locals. In the long run migrants are 
expected to earn more than the residents for migration it must be 
remembered is a self-selection process whereby only the more 
dynamic and the more capable are thrown up. Our results however 
show the recent migrants to be earning more than those who have settled 
in the city: the new arrivals about 20.1$ more than the inhabitants of th 
city, the relatively settled 23«1$ more while the settled ones only 12$ rpc 
explanation of these coefficients can be the increasing economic 
importance of Rawalpindi in recent years because of the development 
of the new capital on its out ;kirts. The city in the recent past has been 
offering better opportinitions and thus providing incentives for better 
aualified people to migrate to it. Therefore existing earnings could 
be a reflection of differing market conditions at the time of migration. 
Another surprising fact about migrants is revealed by the following 
cress-tabulation. 
Regular Employeed Self Employed 
with employeed 
Migration 1-3 years 84.5 % 15»5 % 
Migration 4-6 years 77.6 % 22.4 % 
Migration 7-15 " 56-2 % 38.8 % 
The dual economy suggests that most of the migrants especially the 
recent ones would be found in the informal sector which by definition 
corresponds to our self-employed with employees. The above results 
however contradicts this hypothesis. A large majority of the recent 
migrants it seems are able to find regular employment. ihis could bo 
indicative of any number of things; for example are these immigrants more 
productive than the others to be able to get regular jobs so quickly? 
Is it a result of the government's regional policy that these people 
get better jobs? Is the earning pattern indicative of this distribution 
amongst the sectors? etc. 
Returning now to the results in table 2 contd. note that we are 
using the unconstrained wage rate specificataon in our regressions. 
Economic theory suggests that the wage rate be used as the dependent 
variable for it is this variable on which the individual labour supply 
27 
decisions are based . Although we do not use the wage rate explicitly 
as a dependent variable, however controlling for hour s worked in essence 
means that we are calculating a wage rate equation., An additional 28 
benefit is that we get a coefficient for hours worked . A comparison o! 
regression 1 to 6 illustrates the above point. Both regressions use 
the same number of variables and the same functional form the only 
difference being in the dependent variable. It is evident that 
differences where they exist are not alarming. 
The coefficient of hours worked the results indicate is 0.190. 
An elasticity coefficient, this should be interpreted as a 10% increase 
29 
m the number of hours worked producing a 1.90% increase in income . 
Decreasing returns to extra hours worked are indicated. Had the coefficic 
been equal to one we would have had an exact wage rate equation, and 
proportional returns to working additional hours, •'-'he low value of 
the coefficient is probably an indication of the costs of leisure 
being very high. People are probably willing to work at differing and lev 
27 
ivach individual works upto the point where his marginal rate of 
substitution of leisure for money is equal to the wage rate. 
28 
Author reason for using this specification is that we are not 
sure of our hours worked variable. In fact there is reason to believe 
that there may have been some misreporting. 
29 
Income is a concave- function of hours worked. 

As expected the coefficient for both females and singles are 
IT * negative,, xor the former the result is probably indicative of 
discrimination while for the latter of self-selection process. 
For females in fact a further testable hypothesis v/ould be that not 
only does the market discriminate against them in terms of salaries 
and wages but also in terms of the number of employment opportunities 
open to them. 
An additional unpaid family helper adds about 23% to an | 
individuals income. This figure however may be taken as an indicatic,n| 
of the helpers productivity and therefore, of their contribution to ] 
family income. 
A comparison of regression 4 to regression 1 show that most of th 
explained variance of earnings is accounted for by t.hp hasie variafeld6, 
33 age, sex, education and marital status . The addition of employment 
2 
status i m m i g r a t i o n and occupation to these variables raises the*R from 
0.337 to 0.^32 i.e., an addition of only about 0.095 to the explanation' 
Regression 3 using only the human capital variables age and education 
2 ' yields an R" of Q.254. About 39% of the explained variance is therefor' 
due to these variables' „ Clearly an important conclusion of the analj-
is that a largo portion of the inequality in earning is attributable 
to diiflfering levels of human capital that individuals acquire. 
33 
In fact the most important v a r i a b l e are age, education and sex: 
that order. The effect cf marital status is not very significant as 
indicated by the beta coefficients. 
34 
" The ctrrect specification however has not been used for the hum 
capital variables,- The other equations are all in the wage rate form i 
controlling f. r hours worked whereas regression 3 is not . Given the v/a; 
rate specification. We would have had on R'" of at least 0.28 increasin. 
the importance of the human capital variables. 
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i'able 3 
Regression 1 Rank Regression 4 Rank Regression 7 Rank 
log monthly log monthly log^monthly 
income income wage' rate 
Age 1.176 1 1 . 304 1 1 . 1 9 8 
, 2 Age -1.123 2 -1. 1 2 9 2 -1.109 
Sox (Female) -0.213 5 -0. 222 5 -0.415 
Marital Status(Single) -0.084 
12 -Oc 109 7 - 0 . 0 6 2 
Education 1 Primary 0.088 10 0. 082 8 0 . 0 8 0 
Education 2 Secondary 0.258 4 Oo 278 4 0 . 2 8 1 
Education 3 High r 0.271 3 0. ,310 3 0 . 2 9 3 
Tech. Education 2 0.036 ' 21 0. ,015 9 0 . 1 2 6 
17 
Migration 1 1-3 Years 0.059 . r 0.03*f 
19 
2 0 Migration 2 1 if 4-6 Yrs 0.070 14 0.072 
21 Migration 3 1 if 7-15 " °-069 15 
2if Employment Status 1 0.017 23 °- 0 0 2 
Employment Status 2 0.173 6 0.141 
Lg Employment Status 3 -O.O38 20 -0.039 
u 7 Occupation 1 irofcssd.aial 0.078 13 0.124 
c'{ & Tech. 
c Occupation 2 1 if a O.O78 11 0.082 
;idn & Management 
(29 Occupation 3 1 if 3 
Clerical 8t related 
ty^ Occn 4 Sales workers 0.064 , 1 6 0.011 
X. Occn 5 Service workers 0.041 18 O.O38 J • 
Occn 6 Agricultural 0.021 22 0.024 
T Hours worked 0#09if g 0.132 6 , 0.126 
a 
x3/, Y c a r s o n J o b O.157 7 0.126 
X No of unpaid family 0.129 8 0.144 
helpers. 
-J2S:- :••• 
As is well known that size of the least squeres coefficient in th 
classicial linear model, 'is not a reliable measure of the relative impt; 
an independent variable in determining the variation in the regressand. 
The size of -these coefficients can easily be varied by changing the 
units of - measurement. Of the three objective measures of the size of 
a coefficient we have chosen the beta-coefficients. Table 3 present the 
beta-coefficients for 3 of our regressions. The coefficients have been 
2 
ranked according to size. The ranking reveals age and age as being the 
fore most in affecting income distribution followed closely by the two 
education categories, secondary and higher. Thereafter the rankings 
show sex, the richer self-employed, unpaid family helpers, years on 
the job, hours worked, primary education, administrative accupation, 
maritql status migration 2 and the remaining occupation and employment 
status 'variables. £hus again we find that age and education the two 
human Capital variables are the most important in affecting the 
distribution of income. 
SOME ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
c , 
The regression results of the last section revealed that the bulk 
of the self-employed ie. those without employees (SEI) earn no more than 
regular employees (RE). The self-employed with employees (SE 2) make abc 
58% more and the casual (CE) make 20?^  less than the RE. In the rankings 
the beta-coefficients the SE1 and the CE were among the lowest. There is 
no indication however, of how well the model used explains the variation * 
earnings within these categories. The importance of the human capital 
variables in the previous results may have been due to the larger proport 
of the RE in our sample (60^). For the SE and the CE, most probably the 
structural variables or some . other unidentified forces may explain the i 
-:29s-
difforential. The reasoning of the thoory of human capital in fact, implies 
th-t the acquisition of capital in this form is more likely to benefit the 
35 EE than the others . 
There is therefore a need to examine in detail, the results of the 
T : r e v i o u s section cxpecially with regard to employment status. For this reason 
36 -n 
four subsarajles were selected, one for each employment status » For 
each subsanple then, two regressions were run. •'•he results are presented in 
table k and the salient features of these are discussed belowi-> . 0 
(i) Note first that in the CE category there are very few observations* 
m 2 
too few in fact for a meaningful analysis - The high R ' s are not 
as much an indication of a good fit as of the lack of a reasonable 
number of observations. At best the results for this category 
are highly unreliable and will not be stressed. 
(ii) Not surprisingly, the model fits the RE the best and the SE 1 the 
1 ast. In the earlier regressions for all the earners, therefore 
the greater part of the explanation was due to the presence of the p 
RE. The R of O .361 for the SE however, is better than expected. 
The model used thus explains well the variation in earnings within • 
this category. 
i 
(iii) In table 2 most of the explained variation In incomes is duo to the 
four variables, age, sex, education and marital status. These 
variables now account for about 9.4 82.3% and kk.k% of this 
explained variation within the RE SE 1 and the SE 2 respectively. 
As before in -the ranking of the beta-coefficients in each of the 
employment status categories the age and education variables 
20 
Remember investment in human capital raises an individuals earnings 
by raising his productivity. Employers will be willing to pay for higher 
productivity but customersat a shop may not. The possibility of the person 
using his human capital to improve his business however alv/ays remains. In 
this case the human capital by x hypr,thesis would hold amongst the SE too. 
36.,. 
Alternatively, we could have used interaction terms but this 
procedure would have multiplied to an uncontrollable limit the number of 
variables. 


"57 dominate the others . The conclusion therefore would be that the human 
capital vari"bles are important in explaining the income differential in all 
the employment status categories- A qualification however may be added, 
that the applicability and the effectiveness of the human capital model is 
greater among the Rfi than the others. 
•'-he age ant'1, education coeff'icents turn out as expected for each of the 
subsampleso The age-earnings profiles sire all concave and peak at 45 for 
the RE, SE1 and CE and at 50 for the SE 2. Not surprisingly, the 
coefficients for education are the largest for the' RE„: i . • 
(v) Most of the SE 1 and SE 2 are sales workers, while the RE are mainly 
clerical workers. I-n -view of the description of Rawalpindi 'given above, ; " 
this result is hardly surprising. The most paying occupation however 
5 I : ••;• 
is still the administrative and managerial. 
(vi) The mean income is the highest for the SE 2m but for these individuals 
we know a part of their income is.a return en capital.: Between the SE1 and the 
RE, the former have a slightly higher mean income, (a difference of Rs. 25«6)> 
It was because 'of this difference that in the full, sample'regression'the" ',' 
coefficient for the SE1 was small, positive and insignificant. 
(vii) Inequality as ,;iven by the standard deviation of the logarithum of incomes 
is the least amongst the SE2 and the most arhongst the CE. Income amongst 
i 
the SE1 however is more unequally distributed than among the RE. For the 
SE1 and the CE the inequality index is greater than the equivalent index for 
the full sample. 1 1 ' 
37 
For the self-employment the sex and unpaid family helpers have a larger 
beta-coefficient .than. some, of the .education dummies. For; regular employees 
however the human capital variable are much stronger. As before marital status, 
is the least important. 
(viii) As mentioned earlier the SE 1 and the CE constitute the 
informal sector while the RE the formal. Given this our 
results can serve to provide a tentative verification of 
the dual economy hypothesis. According to this theory 
there are barriers to entry into the formal sector for 
these in the informal sector. The latter would like to 
move into the former sector for incentives like higher 
earnings, shorter working hours, job security etc. According 
to our results however they may not get higher earning in the 
formal sector. But as expected incomes are more equally 
distributed in the formal sector than in the informal, 
(ix) One of the derived variables in the data was the formal/ 
informal. The formal sector was defined as, the government and 
municipality employees, the professionals, employees of large 
scale manufacturing and other firms (more than 20 employees). 
A cross tabulation of this variable with the employment 
status is shown below:-
ESI ES2 RE CE 
Formal 27% 13.3% 70.7% 9.1% 
Informal 97.3% 86.7% 29.3% 90.9% 
There are 29.3% of RE who should be classified in the informal sector. 
To he extent that these people are migrants and low-income - earners 
the above results will be biased. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is quite possible v hen using ordinary least squares in the classical 
linear model to ret spurious results. In particular biased results 
arc likely to result if (a) the regression errors are not randomly distributee 
v/ith zero mean and constant variance and (b) if these errors are not 
70 
uncorrelated with each other and with the dependent variable . These doubts 
however Were easily dispelled when the residuals in Standardised form, for od 
main regression (regression 1 ) were plotted against the estimated value of 
income, agains standardised. A symetrical spherical pattern emerged indicatii 
that there was no departure from the ssumptions of homoskedasticity and 
independence. 
When using such a large number of variables especially as most of 
them are in the binary form, there is a likelihood of multicolinearity 
affecting the results. The presence of this problem would bias both 
the size of the regression coefficents and the value of their standard 
errors. No special tests for colinearity were conducted but several checks w 
made ho detect its resence. First an inspection of the correlation matrix 
for the independent variables showed that there was no cause for alarm. 
Second each of the independent variables was in turn regressed on the other 
2 independent variables to tost vfor linear ^dependence. The R was mostly 
below O.JO and never more thd& 0.55*„ Third the rise of the regression 
coefficient;: was not changed much by the addition or deletion of variables 
from regressions. The presence of' multicolinearity on the other hand would 
•have caused violent changes in the size of the coefficients with changes in 
the number ot' vavi.-iht .v.. V.o mav conclude therefore multicolinearity does not 
38 
On the other hand our results may be.suffering from a simultaneous 
equation bias. xhe occupation, employment status, education etc. may not all 
bo predetermined variables but some may be chdce variables. We would therefoJ 
have a simultaneous equation model on our hands of which we have estimated one 
under-identifi d equation. In this case the wrong estimation technique ordim 
least squares was used. It is not however clear what the correct simultaneouj 
equation model is. A lot would depend on what assumptions one makes, which 
variables are the endogenous ones etc. For our purposes however the single 
equation model is all right for we take the characteristics of the individual 
as given and ask the question how these effects his income. 
- : 35 : - ... ... 
affect our results. 
From our analysis we may therefore conclude that the human capital 
variables explain a large part of the income differential39. Age and 
educatiofi' both affect income as expocted. Given greater equality in 
education therefore it wculd be reasonable to expect more closely 
grouped together age-earnings profiles and therefore reduced inequality 
Interestingly enough the human capital variables explained the larger 
part of the variation in earnings. Returns to education followed the 
same pattern across sectors; increasing returns to increasing levels of 
education. 
For the dual market hypothesis our results Bhow that individuals 
in the informal sector earn about as much or may be slighlly more than 
those in the formal. Income however is more unequally distributed 
in the former sector than in the latter. The barriers to entry if any 
however we cannibt identify in this analysis. But it seems as if there 
is no financial incentive for moving from the informal sector to the 
formal. Two incentives for such a move can howevdr be identified from 
our analysis; (a) shorter working hours and honce opportunity for 
secondary employment, (b) a more equally distributed guaranteed monthly 
earnings. There are however a number of other incentives which one 
can hypothesise like freedom from the vicissitudes of the market, 
old age pension, paid holidays and other such employment benefits. 
The results for migration were interesting enough to deserve a 
mention here, h^e pattern of earnings for migrants was concave to the 
relatively settled earned the mo.qt followed by the recent arrivals and 
39 
Generalisations beyond the city however must be made bearing in mind 
the socio-economic description of the city given in section 3. The lack of large 
scale manufacturing industry and the unusually large presence of the government 
sector in the form cf Islamabad the capital probably biases the results in 
favour of the human capital variables. 
"the settled". However migrants every where earned more than the local 
residents. Contrary to the dual economy theory the majority of the 
migrants were found in regular employment. In fact 85% of the recent 
r.i r ntn arc in regular errloyment. These individuals are not therefore 
as theory predicts using the informal sector as a point of eating. 
To conclude therefore, our main result is the applicability and 
importance of the human capital variables in explaining the income 
differential. Both work experience and higher levels of education seem 
to command a premium in the market. But do the educated earn, more 
because they are more productive? or more able ? or because they happen 
to belong to influential families? Unfortunately none of these questions 
can be assumed with any degree of accuracy by our analysis. Data on 
family background was not available, and so the effects of parental 
education, income etc. on earnings. .and education could not be 
observed. Ability as is obvious would be an exceedingly difficult 
variable to measure. No assessments of the filtering process of 
education, ie. the sorting out of the more able from the lesser can 
therefore be made. 
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